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An Essay on Texas v. Lesage
by Christina B. Whitman*
When I was invited to participate in this symposium,' I was asked to
discuss whether the causation defense developed in Mt. Healthy City
School DistrictBoard of Educationv. Doyle2 applied to cases challenging
state action under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. As I argue below, it seems clear that Mt. Healthy does
apply to equal protection cases. The Supreme Court explicitly so held
last November in Texas v. Lesage.3 But the implications of Lesage go
beyond questions of causation. The opinion suggests that the Court may
be rethinking (or ignoring) its promise in Carey v. Piphus4 that section
19835 plaintiffs can recover nominal damages and, when actual6 injury
can be established, damages for mental and emotional distress.

* Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, University of Michigan
Law School. University of Michigan (B.A., 1968; M.A., 1970; J.D., 1974).
1. On Saturday, January 8, 2000, at its annual meeting in Washington, D.C., the
Employment Discrimination Section of the Association of American Law Schools sponsored
a program that treated the Mt. Healthy doctrine. Participating in a panel presentation at
this program were Robert Belton, Sheldon H. Nahmod, Michael L. Wells, Christina Brooks
Whitman, and Michael J. Zimmer.
2. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
3. 120 S. Ct. 467 (1999).
4. 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
5. This statute provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. III 1997). This statute thus provides a cause of action for those
who seek damages and other relief from "persons" who have violated their federal rights
"under color of" state law. As such, it is the basis for most cases seeking redress for
constitutional injuries.
6. 435 U.S. at 259-64, 266-67.
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In Mt. Healthy the Supreme Court was presented with a claim by a
public school teacher that his contract had not been renewed in violation
of the First Amendment. The teacher established that the School
Board's decision against renewal of his contract was motivated in part
by its reaction to his communications with a local radio station about
school matters. The teacher sought and won reinstatement from the
lower federal courts.7 The Supreme Court vacated his victory.' The
Court held that, even accepting that plaintiff's communication with the
radio station was protected First Amendment activity and that
retaliation for this activity played a substantial part in the Board's
decision not to renew the employment contract, such action by the Board
would not amount to a constitutional violation justifying remedial
authority if the Board could establish that it would have reached the
same decision not to renew in the absence of the unconstitutional
motivation.9 In essence, Mt. Healthy established that defendants in
"unconstitutional motivation" cases can prevail by proving that they
would have reached the same decision even if they acted constitutionally.
The answer to the question of whether Mt. Healthy's approach to
causation applies to equal protection cases seems straightforward. On
the same day in 1978 that the Court decided Mt. Healthy, it also decided
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp.10 Plaintiffs in Arlington Heights challenged the refusal of the
Village of Arlington Heights to rezone land to allow multiple-family (and
thus more affordable) housing. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and
injunctive relief, alleging that the racially discriminatory effect of the
Village's refusal to rezone meant that its decision violated the Equal
Protection Clause." The Court ruled against plaintiffs on the ground
that discriminatory effects were not enough to make out an equal
protection violation. 2 A showing of racial animus by the Village
decisionmaker was required, and plaintiffs failed to establish that such
animus was a motivating factor in the Village's decision.'" However,
the Court said in a footnote that the approach to causation articulated
in Mt. Healthy might bar recovery even if a showing of racial animus

7. 429 U.S. at 276, 282-83.
8. Id. at 287.

9. Id. at 285.
10. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
11. Id. at 254, 258.

12. Id. at 264-71.
13. Id. at 270; see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-45 (1976) (holding that
a showing of discriminatory purpose is essential to establishing a claim of racial
discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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had been made.14 If plaintiffs had proven that the Village had been
motivated by a racially discriminatory purpose, the Court said, the
burden of proof would have shifted to the Village to establish that "the
same decision would have resulted even had the impermissible purpose
not been considered." 5 If a same-decision showing had been made by
the Village, plaintiffs' injury could no longer be fairly attributed to the
discriminatory purpose that was the basis of the constitutional violation
and "there would be no justification for judicial interference with the
For this proposition the Court cited Mt.
challenged decision.""
Healthy. Thus, from the very conception of the Mt. Healthy causation
doctrine, the Court has understood it to apply to equal protection cases.
Just last November, in its puzzling, brief opinion in Texas v. Lesage,
the Supreme Court reiterated that there is no distinction between First
Amendment cases and Equal Protection Clause cases for purposes of the
Mt. Healthy doctrine. 7 Plaintiff in Lesage, "an African immigrant of
Caucasian descent,"'" brought an action under sections 1981'9 and
1983 and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 196420 in which he raised
a claim of race discrimination in graduate school admissions. Specifically, Lesage claimed that the University of Texas's Department of
Education considered race in deciding whom to admit to its doctoral
program in counseling psychology. He sought both damages and
declaratory and injunctive relief.2'
The district court dismissed the entire action on a motion for summary
judgment. It concluded that Lesage would not have been admitted even

14.
15.

429 U.S. at 270 n.21.
Id. at 271 n.21.

16.

Id.

120 S. Ct. at 467.
Id. at 468.
This statute provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be
parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings
for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall
be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of
every kind, and to no other.
42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (1994). The Court has interpreted this statute to permit white
plaintiffs to sue for race discrimination. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S.
273, 279 (1976).
20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-7 (1994). Title VI provided the basis for the Fifth
Circuit's rejection of an Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity defense raised by Texas
in Lesage. Lesage v. Texas, 158 F.3d 213, 216-19 (5th Cir. 1998).
21. 120 S. Ct. at 467.
17.
18.
19.
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if the program had been race-blind.22 The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals, which previously held affirmative action programs in institutions of higher education to be unconstitutional, 21 reversed.2 4

The

court of appeals said that the fact the University would have reached the
same decision-the Mt. Healthy question-was irrelevant to a decision
on a motion for summary judgment. 25 The proper order in which to
consider plaintiff's claim was to begin by asking whether his application
had been rejected as part of a race-conscious process.2 s If the answer
to that question was yes, the court said, a showing by the University
that it would have reached the same decision had it not considered race
may well mean that Lesage could not recover compensatory damages,
but it would not foreclose other relief.27 A motion for summary
judgment, under this analysis, raises only the question of liability. Once
liability for a constitutional violation has been found, Mt. Healthy might
foreclose certain remedies.
The Supreme Court refused to cordon off questions of relief at the
summary judgment stage. It held that the Fifth Circuit's decision
reversing the district court's grant of summary judgment on Lesage's
damages claim contradicted the Mt. Healthy framework for analyzing
same-decision claims.2" The Mt. Healthy framework applies at the
summary judgment stage because the same-decision showing goes to the
ultimate issue of liability under section 1983.29 Under Mt. Healthy a
government defendant "can ...

defeat liability," in race discrimination

cases as in First Amendment retaliation cases, by proving that it would
have made the same decision without considering the forbidden
factor.30 If such a showing is made, the Court concluded, "there is no
cognizable injury warranting relief under section 1983." 31

22. Id. at 468.
23. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 944 (5th Cir. 1996). The Fifth Circuit decided
Hopwood while the Department was in the process of accepting applications to the class
that Lesage sought to enter. Lesage, 158 F.3d at 215.
24. 158 F.3d at 222.
25. Id.
26. Id. The court of appeals disagreed with the district court's conclusion that there
was no factual dispute on this issue. It thought that the deposition of the chair of the
admissions committee offered some evidence to support Lesage's allegation that race had
been considered at the stage of the process at which his application had been rejected. Id.
at 219-22.
27. Id. at 222.
28. 120 S. Ct. at 469.

29. Id. at 468.
30. Id.
31.

Id.
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On the particular issue of whether Mt. Healthy applied to this equal
protection case, the Court could not have been more clear:
Our previous decisions on this point have typically involved alleged
retaliation for protected First Amendment activity rather than racial
discrimination, but that distinction is immaterial. The underlying
principle is the same: The government can avoid liability by proving
that it would have made the same decision without the impermissible
motive. 2
The Court has thus returned to where it began and treated the
causation doctrine of Mt. Healthy as applicable to all mixed-motive
claims arising under the Constitution. But Lesage confuses a different
issue. Despite its reversal of the ruling on Lesage's summary judgment
motion and the apparent conclusiveness of the language stating that
"[the government can avoid liability," the Court's opinion suggests that
a Mt. Healthy same-decision showing by the defendant is not a complete
defense to liability, for it distinguished the case before it from one in
which the plaintiff "challenges
an ongoing race-conscious program and
33
seeks forward-looking relief."
The Fifth Circuit's error, it appears, was that it did not distinguish
among forms of relief when it considered the question of liability at the
summary judgment stage.3 4 The Supreme Court saw Lesage's case as,
at bottom, simply a request for damages relief and therefore dismissible
if Mt. Healthy eliminated the damage claim.35 It is true that Lesage
also asked for declaratory and injunctive relief, but the Court assumed
that he was no longer seeking forward-looking relief.36 This conclusion
was based on his failure to contest the University's claim in its petition
for certiorari that it had ceased considering race after the Fifth Circuit's
decision in Hopwood v. Texas.37
In what follows I address two questions raised by these cases. First,
why had it seemed, despite Arlington Heights, that equal protection
cases might be treated differently from retaliation cases? Second, what
is troubling about the dismissal of plaintiff's damages claim in Lesage?
Both inquiries shed light on the Court's view of what it means to be
discriminated against on the basis of race and, more broadly, on its view
of the appropriate scope of remedies for constitutional wrongs.

32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 469.
Id.

36. Id.
37. Id.
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In both Arlington Heights and Mt. Healthy, as in Lesage, plaintiffs
sought to challenge and reverse specific government decisions. Unlike
Lesage, the earlier cases did not seek to challenge the general policies
that underlie those decisions. Indeed, in both Arlington Heights and Mt.
Healthy it appeared that the decisions were made ad hoc, perhaps
unconstitutionally motivated but not based on explicit unconstitutional
policies reaching beyond the situation before the court. Plaintiffs in
Arlington Heights sought to reverse a particular decision, not to change
the zoning for a specific plot of land. 8 Applying Mt. Healthy's samedecision causation doctrine seemed sensible because there seemed to be
"no justification for judicial interference with [a] challenged decision"
that could, at least theoretically, simply be remade with more pure
motivation. 9 Plaintiff in Mt. Healthy sought damages as well as
injunctive relief that would have restored him to his teaching position,
but the damages he sought, based on lost income, were linked to his
claim that he should have retained his job all along.4 ° Again, the claim
was not so much for retroactive relief as it was for reversal of a
government decision, and again the Court concluded that it would be
inappropriate to reverse a decision that could be remade to the same
result with a nonretaliatory motive.4' In both cases the Court seemed
concerned that granting relief either would be meaningless or would
force the government to live with an incorrect decision.
The causation analysis in Mt. Healthy has been criticized as reflecting
a faulty conception of cause-in-fact analysis in tort. Although the Court
cited no tort cases, it seems to have been using a concept of but-for
causation that, in tort, requires the plaintiff to establish that but for the
defendant's wrongful conduct the plaintiff would have suffered no injury.
Another way to articulate the test is as follows: If the plaintiff would
have suffered the injury even if the defendant had acted properly, there
is no recovery in tort.42 Justice Rehnquist, in Mt. Healthy, cast this
argument as a defense rather than as part of plaintiff's case,43 but the
resemblance is clear.
Critics of Mt. Healthy argue that Justice Rehnquist overlooked the
development in tort of an alternative approach to causation that is more
suited to mixed-motive cases. In certain tort cases involving multiple

38. 429 U.S. at 254.
39. Id. at 271 n.21.

40. 429 U.S. at 277.
41. Id. at 287.
42. See, e.g., New York Cent. R.R. Co. v. Grimstad, 264 F. 334, 335 (2d Cir. 1920); see
also DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTs § 168 (2000).
43. 429 U.S. at 284-87.
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defendants when each tortfeasor's behavior was sufficient to cause the
injury, the but-for test leads to the troubling result that an innocent,
injured plaintiff cannot recover because neither tortfeasor's conduct was
necessary to the result. The classic example is the destruction of
property by a fire created by the commingling of two separate fires, each
set independently and each sufficient to destroy the plaintiff's property." The plaintiff cannot, in such a case, prove that but for each
particular defendant's conduct he would not have been injured. The
result under the but-for test is that the injured victim has no remedy,
and two wrongful actors escape liability. To avoid this result, tort law
developed an alternative rule. This alternative, which has been called
the substantial factor test, holds a defendant liable when his tortious
conduct is a substantial factor in causing the destructive result. 45

If

both fires are substantial, both negligent defendants will be required to
contribute, and the plaintiff will be fully compensated. The substantial
factor test has been extended to situations in which one source is
tortious and the other is unknown,"' and also to situations in which one
source is tortious and the other is known and innocent. 47 The rationale
in all these cases is that it would be unfair to require an innocent
plaintiff to bear a loss when there is an available wrongdoer who played
a substantial causal role.
In the Mt. Healthy context, the argument goes, a similar substantial
factor approach should have been adopted. If plaintiff established that
an unconstitutional motive played a substantial role in the government
decision not to renew his employment contract, the Court should have
awarded relief. Justice Rehnquist's rejection of that approach is telling:
A rule of causation which focuses solely on whether protected conduct
played a part, "substantial" or otherwise, in a decision not to rehire,
could place an employee in a better position as a result of the exercise
of constitutionally protected conduct than he would have occupied had
he done nothing."
Justice Rehnquist did not see plaintiff as an innocent victim who would
have been left unfairly destitute if he was denied a remedy. If a
defendant can make a same-decision showing, the plaintiff could have

44. See, e.g., Cook v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Ry. Co., 74 N.W. 561,

566 (Wis. 1898).
45. See, e.g., Vincent v. Fairbanks Meml Hosp., 862 P.2d 847, 851 (Alaska 1993); see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965).
46.
47.
45, 49
48.

See, e.g., Kingston v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 211 N.W. 913, 914 (Wis. 1927).
See, e.g., Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Ry. Co., 179 N.W.
(Minn. 1920).
429 U.S. at 285.
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been justifiably discharged from the position he seeks to reclaim. To
reinstate a plaintiff under those circumstances either would be futile,
because he would be shortly discharged again, or, if a second discharge
is forbidden, would require the government to retain a worker who
should be dismissed.
It is significant that the Court saw both Arlington Heights and Mt.
Healthy as requests for specific judicial interference in a current and
ongoing dispute between the parties. That is not the situation in the
tort cases in which the plaintiffs seek only compensatory damages. Even
if the analogy between multiple defendants (in the tort context) and
multiple motives (in the constitutional contexts) holds, plaintiffs in
Arlington Heights and Mt. Healthy were asking for more than damages.
In a sense they were even asking for more than they would be seeking
had they requested an injunction to require the government to act
constitutionally in future cases. Plaintiffs in Arlington Heights and Mt.
Healthy were asking the Court to require the government to live with a
decision that the government correctly believed was wrong. That is
more than tort law requires of negligent actors.
In both Arlington Heights and Mt. Healthy, the Court said that a
same-decision showing by the defendant bars injunctive relief that would
change the status quo.49 The Court refused to overturn the specific
decisions upon which plaintiffs based their claims of injury. In Arlington
Heights the Court spoke only to that point: If defendant carried its
burden of proof on causation, "there would be no justification for judicial
interference with the challenged decision."' ° The language of Mt.
Healthy is more ambiguous, suggesting that defendant's showing might
mean that there was no "constitutional violation justifying remedial
action."51
The ambiguity became problematic when plaintiffs sought broader
remedies in improper-motive cases. Just a year after Mt. Healthy, the
Court issued the first in a series of opinions addressing a very different
sort of race discrimination claim from that raised in Arlington Heights.

49. Something similar may have motivated Congress when, in the 1991 amendments
to Title VII, it overruled one aspect of the plurality's opinion in Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), and explicitly provided that a defendant who establishes that
it would have reached the same decision even in the absence of discriminatory intent does
not avoid liability completely. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 107(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(g)(2)(B) (1994). After the 1991 amendments, establishing this defense bars damages, not
declaratory or injunctive relief, except that orders "requiring any admission, reinstatement,
hiring, promotion, or payment [of back pay]" are also barred if this defense is established.

Id.
50. 429 U.S. at 271 n.21.
51. Id. at 285.
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These cases, like Lesage, challenged race-conscious government programs
designed to benefit minorities who were victims of past discrimination.
Unlike the earlier cases, plaintiffs typically sought both to reverse
particular employment or admission decisions and to obtain injunctions
that would change ongoing, generally applicable government policies.
The first of these cases to be addressed on the merits was Regents of
the University of California v. Bakke,52 which presented a challenge to
the race-conscious admissions program at the Medical School of the
University of California at Davis. The University stipulated that it
could not prove that it would have reached the same decision on Bakke's
application for admission if it had ignored race.53 In dicta the Court
addressed the argument that Bakke would have lacked standing to bring
the suit had he failed to establish that a victory in court would have led
to his admission to medical school.54 Not only was this argument
foreclosed by the University's stipulation, but, the Court added, Bakke
would have had standing in any case.55 The trial court found evidence
of an injury in fact (in addition to his failure to be admitted) that would
have been redressed by a decision in his favor.56 According to the trial
court, Bakke was injured by the University's "decision not to permit
[him] to compete for all 100 places in the class, simply because of his
race."57 So long as the plaintiff alleges that he will try again, an injury
so defined would be redressed by an injunction prohibiting a raceconscious policy.
Subsequent cases reiterated and refined this definition of an equal
protection injury, and each of them involved a challenge to government
consideration of race in a program designed to benefit minorities. In City
of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.," Justice O'Connor said that the white
plaintiffs had been personally injured because they were denied the
"opportunity to compete for a fixed percentage of public contracts based
solely upon their race."59 In Northeastern Florida Chapter of the
Associated General Contractorsof America v. City of Jacksonville,'° the
Court explained this kind of injury more fully:

52. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
53. Id. at 280.
54. Id. at 280 n.14.

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id.
Id. at 281 n.14.
Id.
488 U.S. 469 (1989).
Id. at 493.
508 U.S. 656 (1993).
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When the government erects a barrier that makes it more difficult for
members of one group to obtain a benefit than it is for members of
another group, a member of the former group seeking to challenge the
barrier need not allege that he would have obtained the benefit but for
the barrier in order to establish standing. The "injury in fact" in an
equal protection case of this variety is the denial of equal treatment
resulting from the imposition of the barrier, not the ultimate inability
to obtain the benefit.6'
The link between this approach to causation and the particular remedy
sought by plaintiff was emphasized in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena.6 2 Like NortheasternFlorida,Adarand was brought by a plaintiff
who sought to enjoin a system for awarding government contracts that
gave an advantage to businesses owned by members of historically
disadvantaged groups." Having been denied a contract in the past, the
Court said, did not entitle plaintiff in Adarand to an injunction against
"any future use" of the preferential clause, but neither was plaintiff
required to "demonstrate that it ... will be ... the low bidder on a
Government contract" to obtain such relief."' To establish standing
plaintiff was required only to show "that sometime in the relatively near
future it will bid on another Government contract" under the challenged
system.65
This broader definition of the injury-a definition that focuses on the
possibility that the plaintiff will be subjected to the same tainted
decision-making process in the future, rather than on whether the same
negative decision will be reached-overcomes the causal problem
identified in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons. 66 The Court in Lyons denied
standing to a plaintiff who sought to enjoin the use of life-threatening
choke holds by police officers who were not threatened with deadly
force.67 Lyons had been subjected to such a choke hold in the past, but
the Court denied injunctive relief against the practice because he could
not satisfy the Court that he would be subjected tG the same practice in
the future." Seen in this light, the redefinition of standing in Bakke

61. Id. at 666.
62. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
63. Id. at 204.
64. Id. at 210-11.
65. Id. at 211.
66. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
67. Id. at 105.
68. Id. at 105-13. It is not clear why an argument similar to that accepted in Bakke,
Northeastern Florida,and Adarand could not be made by the plaintiff in a case like Lyons.
Such a plaintiff could allege that he has been deprived of an opportunity to live in a
community free from the fear of encountering an abusive police practice. The Court in

20001

AN ESSAY

631.

and its progeny addresses a different problem and a different sort of
claim than that made in Mt. Healthy. The Court in Mt. Healthy refused
to grant an injunction that would have overturned a single, allegedly
tainted decision that could have been justified on alternative grounds.
The equal protection cases permitted injunctions that remove one factor.
from future decision-making processes. Neither line of cases addressed
the question of whether compensatory damages would be appropriate.
However, if the most expansive language of Mt. Healthy is read to say
that there is no constitutional violation at all when the defendant would
have reached the same decision had it relied only on permissible
reasons, the preferential-treatment cases suggest that proof of causation
may be less of a problem in Equal Protection Clause mixed-motive cases
than in First Amendment cases. If an equal protection injury is
complete at the point that an individual is subjected to a discriminatory
practice, the causal connection found lacking in Mt. Healthy exists, for
there is a link between the defendant's conduct and the injury to the
plaintiff. Under this approach, the dicta in Arlington Heights may have
been too hastily drafted. Potential residents excluded by the Village's
decision could be said to be injured by being subjected to a decisionmaking process tainted by race. Or, perhaps Arlington Heights could be
distinguished from Adarand in that plaintiffs in Arlington Heights were
not individually subjected to a competition for scarce resources of the
sort that would support a claim of personal injury.
This is the analysis that led to the proposition that equal protection
cases might not be subject to Mt. Healthy. Under Mt. Healthy the
defendant is allowed to introduce evidence that there is no causal
connection between the constitutional violation and the plaintiff's injury.
In retaliatory discharge cases after Mt. Healthy, it might plausibly be
thought that a defendant's same-decision showing means that there was
no constitutional violation because there was no termination because of
the employee's speech. The Mt. Healthy requirement would not be
avoided in equal protection cases, but it would be satisfied by a
redefinition of the injury suffered by the plaintiff. Even if the plaintiff
would not be hired under a program that paid no attention to race, there
would be a constitutional violation when he was not considered on the
same grounds as other candidates because of his race.

Lyons appeared to believe that the odds of plaintiff actually having such an encounter were
so remote that such a fear would be irrational. Id. at 105-06. An allegation by a
disappointed bidder that he will bid again on a government contract is more specific and
apparently more credible. Or, perhaps the Court in Lyons saw plaintiff as actually
challenging a discrete decision of individual police officers rather than seeking an
injunction against an ongoing policy. Id. at 110.
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It now appears that the relief sought in the mixed-motive and equal
protection cases is more significant to their conclusions than this
argument suggests. The usual mixed-motives plaintiff, as described
above, seeks to reverse the specific decision in his individual case.
Retaliation claims, unlike equal protection claims, usually grow out of
discrete, isolated incidents. It is not typical for employers who impose
job sanctions for speech to record their practice explicitly in a policy that
might apply to future cases, retaliation plaintiffs seldom ask for broadbased, forward-looking relief against such policies. But in every equal
protection case that has articulated a redefinition of the plaintiff's
injury, the relief sought has been prospective relief against an ongoing
program based on race. None of these cases order that a particular
plaintiff be promoted or admitted or given back pay when the defendant
can establish it would have reached the same, individual decision
without considering race. Under this interpretation the causation
analysis focuses not on the link between defendant's decision and some
injury to the plaintiff, but on the link between the decision and an injury
that would be redressed by the specific relief sought. Mt. Healthy, then,
is about standing, not simply causation, and the suggestion in Lesage
that a claim for forward-looking relief against "an ongoing race-conscious
program"69 would be treated differently under Mt. Healthy becomes
unremarkable.
However, it is not clear why the framing of the injury in the equal
protection cases challenging race-conscious governmental programs does
not support the damages claim made by plaintiff in Lesage, and the
Supreme Court's abrupt order requiring summary judgment on that
claim is quite remarkable. Taken seriously, the Supreme Court's
disposition of the damages claim indicates that it may be rethinking its
commitment to the basic rules for compensatory damages in section 1983
actions laid out two decades ago in Carey v. Piphus. °
In cases like Lesage, which challenge government decision-making
programs and policies on the ground that they incorporate a constitutionally impermissible factor, the precedent described above indicates
that plaintiffs who would not have been selected under a constitutional
program will not receive reinstatement or back pay but are entitled to
declaratory and injunctive relief against the continuing use of the
policies or programs. The troubling question after Lesage is whether
plaintiffs are also entitled to damages that do not represent the reversal
of the government decision but do compensate for the personal injury

69. 120 S. Ct. at 468.
70. 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
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(that is, loss of opportunity to be considered under a fair program) that
they suffered.
Under Carey some damages for loss of opportunity would seem to be
appropriate. Carey, which the Court decided the year after Mt. Healthy,
involved a procedural due process claim brought by public elementary
and secondary school students who had been suspended for infractions
of school rules. There was no challenge to rulings on declaratory or
The question was
injunctive relief before the Supreme Court.7 1
whether the students "[were] entitled to recover substantial nonpunitive
damages even if their suspensions were justified." 2 Justice Powell,
writing for the Court, rejected plaintiffs' argument that they should be
able to recover substantial damages without proof of actual injury simply
because their constitutional rights had been violated.7" Explicitly
limiting its ruling to the procedural due process context, the Court held
that presumed damages could not be awarded, but it did allow "nominal
damages without proof of actual injury"74 and left open the possibility
that plaintiffs in particular cases could establish actual damages in the
form of "mental and emotional distress ... caused by the denial of
procedural due process itself." 5 Applying the Carey analysis to
retaliation and equal protection cases, commentators have understandably assumed that nominal damages and substantiated actual damages
can be recovered even when the defendant makes a same-decision
showing, and that a plaintiff who is awarded either of the forms of
damages that survive Carey, or punitive damages, may well be eligible
for an award of attorney fees." To be specific, in the equal protection
context, actual damages, such as emotional distress, attributable to the
deprivation of the opportunity-defined in Bakke, NortheasternFlorida,
and Adarand-to compete for government benefits in a constitutionally
run program might support a substantial award in an appropriate case.
Nominal damages, which ought to be awarded for the deprivation of such
an opportunity, might themselves support attorney fees.
Yet plaintiff's damages claim in Lesage was dismissed on the ground
that defendant would have denied him admission even if it had adopted

71. Id. at 249-53.
72. Id. at 248.
73. Id. at 266.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 263.
76. See, e.g., 1 HAROLD S. LEWIS, JR. & ELIZABETH J. NORMAN, LITIGATING CIVIL
RIGHTS AND EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES § 2.26 (2d ed. 1999); 1 SHELDON H.
NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION § 4:10 (4th ed. 1997).
The "prevailing party" in a § 1983 action may be awarded "a reasonable attorney's fee
as part of the costs." 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (Supp. III 1997).
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a race-neutral program." The Supreme Court's opinion in Lesage is
consistent with prior case law in recognizing that prospective relief
should not be foreclosed by a defendant's same-decision showing,
whether the case is a First Amendment retaliation case or an equal
protection challenge to a government's motive. Although such relief is
rare in the First Amendment context because few governments adopt
explicit, ongoing programs of retaliation, the deprivation of an equal
opportunity to consideration in the distribution of government benefits
satisfies the requirements of City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, and that
deprivation endures even when the government is able to make a samedecision showing. But why was the district court in Lesage so quick to
dismiss plaintiff's damages claim at the summary judgment stage?
Under Carey he ought to have been able to recover at least nominal
damages, and, upon proper proof, actual damages as well.
There are several possible explanations for the Court's ruling on
damages in Lesage. One is simply that plaintiff's framing of his case did
not sufficiently alert the Court to the possibility that he might claim
nominal damages or actual damages that were not linked to his failure
to gain admission, but rather to his distress at being subjected to a raceconscious selection program. Lesage sought monetary relief, but the
Court may have assumed that he was seeking to be placed, financially,
in the position he would have been in had he been admitted. Mt.
Healthy bars such relief.
Perhaps the Court was signaling its understanding that the affimative
implications of Carey are limited to procedural due process claims and
that equal protection plaintiffs will not be allowed to recover either
nominal damages or actual emotional distress damages. The Court in
Carey, responding to plaintiffs' citation of voting rights and racial
discrimination cases, said that "the elements and prerequisites for
recovery of damages appropriate to compensate injuries caused by the
deprivation of one constitutional right are not necessarily appropriate to
compensate injuries caused by the deprivation of another."7" But it
seems perverse to allow proof of actual emotional distress in procedural
due process cases and not in racial discrimination cases. The likelihood
that an African-American plaintiff foreclosed from admission to
professional or graduate school because of his race will suffer emotional
distress entirely attributable to the race-conscious nature of the
admissions process seems both plausible and high-much more likely
than that a student will be distressed by the inadequacy of procedural
protections attendant to his suspension. One of the most resonant

77. 120 S. Ct. at 468.
78. 435 U.S. at 264-65.
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aspects of Brown v. Board of Education79 is its recognition of the
psychological impact of racial segregation even in the absence of
material injury.
Perhaps it is salient that many modern race discrimination cases-including Bakke, Northeastern Florida,Adarand, and Lesage-are
challenges brought by white plaintiffs against programs designed to
benefit previously excluded groups. It may be that the Court regards the
loss of the opportunity to compete in a race-neutral selection process
vindicated by those cases as less likely to result in actual personal injury
of the sort compensated after Carey. Programs that benefit members of
minority races at the expense of whites, unlike those that burden
historically excluded races, cannot be so easily read as expressing a
personal judgment about the presumed worth and capacities of members
of the disadvantaged group. The emotional injury to plaintiffs, if any,
would be distress caused by outrage at how the game is played: "[that
they] were not competing on a level playing field-the cards were
unlawfully stacked against them.""° Yet there is nothing in the Court's
opinions striking down race-conscious programs that benefit minorities
that suggests such a distinction. The very language defining plaintiffs'
loss of an opportunity to compete equally suggests that the Court takes
such claims seriously and is not merely creating a fictional injury to
avoid the strictures of Lyons.
What Lesage might mean is that the Court is backing away from the
affirmative promise of Carey in all section 1983 cases. Although section
1983 plaintiffs have understandably tried to make as much as they can
of the damage possibilities that survived Carey, the Court's opinion in
Carey itself seems designed to discourage plaintiffs as much as possible.
The routes to damage recovery that remain are narrow and are
apparently designed to offer little incentive to litigate. Carey permits
nominal damages but makes no connection between them and attorney
fees. Its acknowledgment that plaintiffs might be able to offer evidence
of actual damages attributable to emotional distress, while not totally
foreclosing the possibility that such damages can be proven, is extremely
skeptical. The Court "fore[saw] no particular difficulty in producing

79. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
80. Price v.City of Charlotte, 93 F.3d 1241, 1248 (4th Cir. 1996). In Price the court of
appeals affirmed an injunction against a race-based promotion program and held that
plaintiffs who would not have been promoted in a race-neutral program had standing to
claim compensatory damages. Id. at 1245. However, the court found that the evidence
offered by plaintiffs in support of their claims of emotional distress was insufficient. Id.
at 1254-57. For example, in characterizing some claims, the court said, "[T]heir injuries,
if any, are properly characterized as disappointment with their superiors, rather than
emotional distress." Id. at 1256.
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evidence that mental and emotional distress actually was caused by""1
the constitutional violation because "[d]istress is a personal injury
familiar to the law."8 2 But that statement follows several paragraphs
in which the Court elaborates its view that "there may well be those who
suffer no distress over the procedural irregularities.

Indeed, ...

a

person may not even know that procedures were deficient until he enlists
the aid of counsel to challenge a perceived substantive deprivation." 3
Moreover, the Court was concerned that a plaintiff's much greater sense
of distress at the (justifiable and thus noncompensable) result of a
flawed decision-making process will be impossible to separate from the
more refined distress caused by the (unconstitutional and thus compensable) process by which the result was reached. 4 Carey does not
promise plaintiffs the hope of significant compensatory relief.
When the Court realized that significant financial recovery could be
obtained despite Carey, it took steps to ensure that the incentives to
litigate remained low. Plaintiffs who used nominal damages as the basis
for a claim of attorney fees were rebuffed in Farrarv. Hobby. 5 The
Court in Farrarheld that, even though plaintiffs who recover nominal
damages are "prevailing parties" under section 1988(b), the "reasonable"
fee award will ordinarily be nothing when the relief granted is very
small.8 The effect of the ruling in Lesage is part of the same trend,
but it is even more discouraging. If summary judgment on a damages
claim is appropriate simply because the defendant has made a samedecision showing, any opportunity to try to prove actual substantial
damages will be foreclosed, and those hardy plaintiffs who are willing to
absorb the costs of litigation to achieve at least "nominal" vindication
will be dismissed.
Lesage indicates that the Court takes very seriously its traditional
preference for equitable relief in constitutional cases. Read most
narrowly, Lesage treats the definition of constitutional injury in cases
challenging race-conscious programs as simply a way to support
standing to seek injunctive relief. Read broadly, it suggests that the
Court is no longer comfortable with the possibility that civil rights
plaintiffs can seek nominal or emotional distress damages when their
material situation would be unaffected by a change in government
behavior.
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